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Abstract
We propose the construction of an unobservable communications net-
work using social networks. The communication endpoints are vertices on
a social network. Probabilistically unobservable communication channels
are built by leveraging image steganography and the social image shar-
ing behavior of users. All communication takes place along the edges of
a social network overlay connecting friends. We show that such a net-
work can provide decent bandwidth even with a far from optimal routing
mechanism such as restricted flooding.
We show that such a network is indeed usable by constructing a botnet
on top of it, called Stegobot. It is designed to spread via social malware
attacks and steal information from its victims. Unlike conventional bot-
nets, Stegobot traffic does not introduce new communication endpoints
between bots. We analyzed a real-world dataset of image sharing between
members of an online social network. Analysis of Stegobot’s network
throughput indicates that stealthy as it is, it is also functionally powerful
– capable of channeling fair quantities of sensitive data from its victims
to the botmaster at ens of megabytes every month.
1 Introduction
Malware is an extremely serious threat to modern networks. In recent years,
a new form of general-purpose malware known as bots has arisen. Bots are
unique in that they collectively maintain communication structures across nodes
to resiliently distribute commands and data through a command and control
(C&C) channel. The ability to coordinate and upload new commands to bots
gives the botnet owner vast power when performing criminal activities, including
the ability to orchestrate surveillance attacks, perform DDoS extortion, sending
spam for pay, and phishing.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
10
7.
20
31
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
1 J
ul 
20
11
The evolution of botnets has primarily been driven by botnet responses
based on the principle of ‘whatever-works’. Early botnets followed a centralized
architecture however the growing size of botnets led to scalability problems.
Additionally, the development of mechanisms that detect centralized command-
and-control servers further accelerated their demise [6, 11, 9]. This led to the
development of a second generation of decentralized botnets. Examples are
Storm and Conficker [25, 19, 20] that are significantly more scalable and robust
to churn.
We believe that one of the main design challenges for future botnets will be
covertness — the ability to evade discovery will be crucial to a botnet’s survival
as organizations step up defense efforts. While there are several covertness
considerations involved, one of the most important ones is hiding communication
traces. This is the topic of the present paper. We hope to initiate a study in the
direction of defenses against covert botnets by designing one in the first place.
We discuss the design of a decentralized botnet based on a model of covert
communication where the nodes of the network only communicate along the
edges of a social network. This is made possible by recent advances in malware
strategies. Social malware refers to the class of malware that propagate through
the social network of its victims by hijacking social trust. Instances include tar-
geted surveillance attacks on the Tibetan Movement [15] and the non-targeted
attack by the Koobface [4] worm on a number of online social networks including
Facebook [1].
By adopting such a communication model, a malicious network such as a
botnet can make its traffic significantly more difficult to be differentiated from
legitimate traffic solely on the basis of communication end-points. Additionally,
to frustrate defense efforts based on traffic flow classification, we explore the use
of covert channels based on information hiding techniques. What if criminals
used steganographic information hiding techniques that exploit human social
habits in designing botnets? Would it be possible to design such a botnet?
Would it be weaker or stronger than existing botnets? These are some of the
questions we hope to answer in this paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe our
threat model along with an overview on JPEG steganography primitives, which
is essential in the design of the social botnet introduced in this paper, Stegobot.
In Section 3 we describe the design and construction of various components.
We evaluate the use of of image steganography in designing the command and
control channel of Stegobot using a real world dataset in Section 4.1; and the
routing mechanism in Section 4.2. This is followed by related work in Section 5
and conclusions in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Threat model
We assume the threat model of a global passive adversary. Since a botnet is a
distributed network of compromised machines acting cooperatively, it is fair to
assume that the defenders will also cooperate (ISPs and enterprises) and hence
have a global view of communication traffic (strong adversary).
We also assume that botnet infections are not detected. As with any botnet
2
Stegobot cannot withstand hundred-percent clean up of all infected machines.
However we expect it to easily withstand random losses of a considerable num-
bers of bots. This assumption is due to the fact that online social networks are
often scale-free graphs. In a seminal paper [5], Albert and Baraba’si showed
that scale-free graphs are highly robust to the removal of randomly selected
nodes. Indeed the real world social graph considered in this paper (see dataset
description in section 4.2) has a power-law degree-distribution with a slope of
γ = 2.3.
2.2 JPEG steganography
A primary goal of this paper is to show that a botnet based on covert channels
can be constructed with a simple design and successfully operated. We use
JPEG steganography to construct communication channels between the bots.
We now review the main results in JPEG steganography that are of relevance
to this paper. A full discussion on the relative merits and demerits of various
design choices is defered until section 5.
We considered the JSteg scheme [3, 21] but the resulting steganographic
capacity of the communication is rather low; steganographic images are de-
tectable [13] even at low embedding rates of 0.05 bits per non-zero non-one
coefficients. A better scheme is proposed by Fridrich et al. [8] who showed that
the average steganographic capacity of grayscale JPEG images with quality fac-
tor of 70 can be approximated to be 0.05 bits per non-zero AC DCT coefficient.
The most recent scheme based on the same principle (of minimal distortion em-
bedding) as the Fridrich scheme is the YASS [23] scheme, which has been shown
undetectable at payloads of 0.05 bits per non-zero DCT coefficient.
3 Stegobot construction
A botnet is a distributed network of a number of infected computers. It is owned
by a human controller called the botherder and consists of three essential
components: the botmaster(s), the bots, and the Command and Control (C&C)
channel. Bots are compromised machines running a piece of software that
implement commands received from one or more botmasters; they also send
botcargo – information acquired by the bot such as the result of executing
botherder commands – to the botmaster. Botmasters refer to compromised
machines that the botherder interacts with in order to send commands via a
C&C channel. The botmaster sends instructions to the bots to carry out tasks
and receives botcargo sent back to it by the bots.
3.1 Design goals
A distinguishing feature of Stegobot is the design of the communication channel
between the bots and the botmaster. Stegobot is designed for stealth, therefore
we do not wish to include any C&C communication links between computers
that do not already communicate.
A further goal is to design probabilistically unobservable communication
channels connecting the botmaster and the bots. If the C&C communication
is unobservable then botnet detection can be significantly more difficult than
3
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Figure 1: The topology of the Stegobot botnet
where communication is not hidden. This is because in the latter case, traffic-
flow signatures and the changes in the structure of traffic connectivity induced
by the presence of the botnet can lead to easier detection and removal of the
botnet [10, 16].
3.2 Malware propagation and bots
The first step in botnet creation is malware deployment. The malware is an
executable which infects the machine and performs the activities necessary of
a bot. Stegobot is designed to infect users connected to each other via social
links such as an email communication network or an online social network that
allows friends to exchange emails. The propagation of malware binaries takes
place via social-malware attacks [15].
Social-malware attacks refer to the use of carefully written email lures to de-
liver botnet malware combined with the use of email communication networks
to propagate malware. This works when the attackers take the trouble to write
emails that appear to come from the co-workers or friends of the victim (so-
cial phish). A more effective attack is to replay a stolen email containing an
attachment that was genuinely composed by a friend back to the victim after
embedding a malicious payload within the attachment.
Once the attacker secures an initial foothold (deploy the malware on at least
one victim’s machine), the attacker can expand the list of compromised machines
with little additional effort. Whenever one of the initial set of victims sends
an email containing an attachment to one of their colleagues, the bot quickly
embeds a malicious payload to the attachment. Upon opening the attachment,
the receiver’s computer also gets infected and the process continues. Therefore
once a single user is compromised (and the compromised machine continues to
be operated for sending emails), the attacker can recruit additional bots in an
automated fashion. Indeed this was the modus operandi behind the Ghostnet
surveillance attacks on both Google and the Tibetan administration in 2009 [15].
Of course the attacker’s attempts at composing email lures can fail with non-
zero probability. However this exercise needs to succeed only once (as explained
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in the previous paragraph) to generate a botnet containing thousands of nodes,
and the risk of failure is offset by targeting multiple people within a social group.
3.3 Bots
In Stegobot, bots possess a pre-programmed list of activities such as harvesting
email addresses and passwords, or credit card numbers or simply to log all
keystrokes. Alternatively, in a more flexible design the bots execute commands
received from the botmaster. For instance, bots receive search keywords from
the botmaster and respond with matches from the filesystem, as in the case of
the Tibetan attacks [15].
As explained in the previous paragraph, Stegobot spreads along the social
network of its victims. While we have used emails to explain social-malware
attacks, the attacks are by no means restricted to email communication networks
alone; online social networks are equally good targets. For instance, Koobface [4]
is a worm that propagates on Facebook over social links, demonstrating that
migrating from conventional email to social network messaging does not insulate
users from social malware attacks. Further, it is noteworthy that Facebook
is adding email extensions to its existing service; and Google added a social
networking service — Google Buzz — to its popular email service in 2010. This
allows bots to communicate with each other and the botmaster over the social
network as explained in the next section.
3.4 Message types
Stegobot uses two types of message constructions. First, Bot-commands are
broadcast messages from the botmaster. Examples include search strings for
file contents or within keylogged data.
Second, botcargo messages return information requested by the botmaster
such as files matching search strings. Botcargo messages can be divided fur-
ther into two types: locally generated (botcargo-local) or forwarded messages
(botcargo-fwd) on a multi-hop route to the botmaster.
3.5 Communication channel
In Stegobot, we use the images shared by the social network users as a media
for building up the C&C channel. Specifically, we use image steganography
techniques to set up a communication channel within the social network, and
use it as the botnet’s C&C channel.
A bot running on a computer can communicate with a bot running on a
different computer if both the computers are being used by people connected
by an edge in the social network. The social network acts as a peer-to-peer
overlay over which the information is transferred from each bot to the bot-
master. In Stegobot, information between bots must only be transferred using
steganographic channels. In our case, this channel is constructed by hiding
the botcargo within images using standard techniques reviewed in earlier sec-
tions. By keeping the size of the botcargo within certain limits, it is possible to
make the presence of bot communication difficult to discover by examining the
communication channel alone (section 4.1).
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One-hop communication takes place according to a push-pull model. Con-
sider the example of Facebook (see figure 2). When a user pushes (uploads)
an image to Facebook from an infected host, the bot intercepts the image and
inserts the botcargo into the image using an image steganography technique as
previously discussed. In our prototype this was done by uploading botcargo into
all pictures on the victim’s computer; a more practical approach might be to
concentrate on a subset of directories where the user stores pictures. Upon com-
pletion of image upload, all the neighbors of the user are notified (by Facebook).
When a neighbor of the publisher logs into Facebook from an infected machine
and views the picture, the bot pulls (intercepts) the image and extracts the
steganographically embedded botcargo from the image. All botcargo is finally
destined for the botmaster who downloads the cargo by viewing newly posted
pictures from her neighbors. When the botmaster intends to issue a command,
she does so by preparing a botcargo message and uploading it to her Facebook
account. It is worth noting that Facebook presently downloads all the images on
to your computer automatically when a Facebook page is visited; the embedded
images don’t need to be clicked on by the victim for botcargo transfer.
While the communication channel used in our design and experiments is
based on Facebook, any social communication mechanism involving rich content
can be utilized in its place. In theory, blocking access to Online Social Networks
(OSNs) will stop Stegobot. In practice, efforts to limit access is not easy since
the use of OSNs for furthering business goals is on the increase. Additionally,
such measures are easily circumvented by determined users leveraging open
anonymizing proxies.
Multi-hop communication: In Stegobot, routing is based on a very simple
algorithm namely restricted flooding.
Congestion control: Each bot maintains a bandwidth throttle which is used
to control the ratio of botcargo-local to botcargo-fwd messages.
Metrics: We measure the effectiveness of the routing strategy using a set of
metrics.
• Channel efficiency the percentage of botcargo-fwd messages that reach the
botmaster averaged over all bots.
• Channel bandwidth is similar to efficiency, but it is the absolute number
of botcargo-fwd messages that reach the botmaster averaged over all bots.
• Duplication count is the number of duplicate botcargo-fwd messages re-
ceived by the botmaster.
• Botnet bandwidth is the total number of botcargo-fwd reaching the bot-
master every month excluding duplicates.
4 Experiments
In order to convince ourselves that a Stegobot deployment could indeed be prof-
itably operated in a real world setting, we performed a number of experiments
which are detailed below.
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Figure 2: Process of sending a one-hop message
4.1 Steganography experiments
We use YASS [23] as the image steganography scheme of the C&C channel over
the Facebook social network. Facebook’s image processing can interfere with
the bots’ steganographic communication channel. In order to minimize this, the
bot performs an image adaption process as follows before embedding a payload:
1) each image is converted to the JPEG format, 2) images are resized to meet
the maximum resolution limits performed by Facebook, i.e., 720 × 720 1. This
is performed keeping the aspect ratio of the images.
We use a database of 116 different images to perform our experiments. In
each experiment an image is adapted to Facebook constraints, as mentioned
before, and then the hidden information is embedded into that image using
YASS scheme. The stego image is then uploaded into Facebook through a
Facebook user account, and then downloaded from the Facebook using another
Facebook account. Finally, the downloaded image is evaluated by the YASS
detector described in [23] in order to extract the hidden message. To evaluate
the robustness of our steganographic process we calculate the bit error rate
(BER) metric which is defined as the ratio of error message bits to the total
number of message bits for each image.
Table 1 summarizes the average of the BER parameter (over all of the im-
ages) for different metrics of YASS scheme. Q is the quality factor of YASS
scheme and represents the amount of compression performed by YASS during
the steganography process. Q has a range of [0, 100] and directly impacts the
quality of the stego image, i.e., higher Q results in images with higher qual-
ity/size. Based on the results of our experiments, Facebook’s uploading process
is equivalent to the application JPEG compression over the image with a quality
factor of Qf . For Q > Qf Facebook applies extra compression on the image
which results in loosing some of hidden information bits. On the other hand
decreasing Q results in lower number of bits being inserted by the YASS scheme.
So, there should be an optimum value for Q within the range of [0, 100] which
minimizes the BER rate, i.e., maximizes the robustness to Facebook perturba-
tions. As table 1 shows the BER values are minimized for a Q = 75, hence we
approximate the quality factor of the Facebook compression to be Qf ≈ 75.
We also investigate the effect of the redundancy parameter of YASS, q, on
the BER. The parameter q represents the number of times an information bit
is repeated inside an image by the YASS scheme. Intuitively, we expect that
larger q results in reducing the BER, since more redundant bits can help better
1More recently, Facebook is allowing uploading of higher-resolution images that increase
the steganographic capacity at least 10 times based on our preliminary experiments
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in reconstructing a noisy message; this is confirmed through our experiments as
table 1 shows. In fact, the q parameter makes a tradeoff between robustness and
steganographic capacity: increasing q improves robustness by reducing BER
while it also reduces the number of data bits inserted by the YASS scheme.
Table 2 shows the number of bits inserted by YASS for different values of q.
Our experiments show that a small number of image, namely bad images,
are responsible for a majority of errors in the average BER. Excluding these
images in the steganography process can significantly reduce average BER. We
define and use a metric, SelfCorr, in order to decide whether an image is ’bad’
or ’good’. The SelfCorr metric evaluates the cross correlation of an image by a
noise-filtered version of itself. We declare images with SelfCorr> 0.9964 as ’bad’
images. Table 3 illustrates the BER results after excluding the small number of
’bad’ images determined by the SelfCorr metric. As can be seen, the average
BER is significantly improved, e.g, the average BER is 0 for q ≥ 12.
Table 1: Average BER (over 116 images) without removing ’bad images’
q 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Q=65 0.3073 0.1320 0.0520 0.0227 0.0097 0.0047 0.0022 0.0010 0.0006 0.0003
Q=70 0.2966 0.1318 0.0529 0.0219 0.0096 0.0049 0.0025 0.0010 0.0005 0.0002
Q=75 0.3015 0.1557 0.0680 0.0283 0.0101 0.0067 0.0027 0.0010 0.0004 0.0000
Q=80 0.3086 0.1839 0.0846 0.0347 0.0143 0.0089 0.0034 0.0015 0.0008 0.0000
Q=85 0.3512 0.2618 0.1777 0.0854 0.0372 0.0183 0.0127 0.0053 0.0024 0.0013
Q=90 0.4287 0.3917 0.3639 0.3390 0.3146 0.2906 0.2567 0.2122 0.1591 0.1262
Table 2: Number of bits inserted in each image for different values of q
q 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Data bits 40280 20140 13426 10070 8056 6173 5754 5035 4475 4028
Table 3: Average BER after removing ’bad images’
q 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Q=65 0.2945 0.1088 0.0311 0.0092 0.0022 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Q=70 0.2836 0.1105 0.0340 0.0095 0.0016 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Q=75 0.2892 0.1372 0.0492 0.0136 0.0011 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Q=80 0.2977 0.1686 0.0662 0.0175 0.0020 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Q=85 0.3436 0.2512 0.1631 0.0646 0.0165 0.0029 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Q=90 0.4255 0.3877 0.3589 0.3331 0.3074 0.2823 0.2464 0.1978 0.1396 0.1035
4.2 Routing results
Combining social-malware with steganographic channels yields a covert botnet
where new bots are recruited as infections spread along the edges of the so-
cial network, while existing bots communicate using the well understood image
based steganographic channels. In this section, we study the routing capabilities
of such a botnet using a real-world example.
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Dataset: We chose to study the Flickr2 social network [2], an online friend-
ship network that facilitates image sharing. We crawled the Flickr website and
downloaded on a fraction of the Flickr social network. Specifically, our dataset
contains 7200 nodes (people), the social network edges (online friendship rela-
tions) between them, and the number of images posted per person per month.
The dataset corresponds to user activity on Flickr over a period of 40 months.
The Flickr dataset will be made available on our website for the research com-
munity.
In our simulation, each bot node generates K botcargo-local (see section 3.4)
messages per month. K = 10 corresponds to say ten files that the bot plans
to route to the botmaster across the social overlay network. ttl is fixed at
log(N = 7000) u 3 hops. Each bot reserves a minimum of 5% of node bandwidth
to forward botcargo-fwd messages received from neighbors. Further, we assume
bot-command messages broadcast from the botmaster at a rate of one message
per month. This means that the botmaster can instruct her bots to change
operation no more than once a month.
Stegobot’s infection strategy is based on social malware attacks. In our
experiments, we have assumed an infection rate of 50%. While this number
might appear high to some readers, it is actually a conservative estimate; social-
malware has been known to have infection rates approaching 90-95% in real-
world attacks [15].
Botcargo preparation: Each bot gathers botcargo (both from the host as
well as from its neighbors). It then encodes as much of the botcargo in a single
image as allowable according to a detection threshold ` bits. The practically
possible values for the number of bits is given in table 2 and a discussion in
section 4.1.
Routing: In Stegobot, routing is carried out by restricted flooding. Each bot
publishes (floods) botcargo to all neighbors (joined the botnet) within ttl hops
in the social network. Finally, the botmaster receives botcargo through the one
of its infected neighbors. We assume that the botmaster is a randomly chosen
node in the network. For each of the graphs below, we averaged the results over
fifty different botmaster nodes.
Figure 3 shows the efficiency of botcargo transmission for increasing amounts
of ttl and various numbers of botcargo-local messages. For K = 5 botcargo-
local messages, the efficiency peaks at 30% and decreases and then stabilizes
for higher ttl values as the resulting increase in the number of botcargo-fwd
messages begins to cause congestion. Congestion effects are also felt when the
number of botcargo-local messages increase even at a smaller ttl. This justifies
our intuition for using ttl = log(N) where N is the number of infected nodes in
the botnet.
In restricted flooding, high-degree nodes in the topology play the role of
hubs and are able to pull and collect large amounts of botcargo. As such they
become a natural point where stolen information is collected and can then be
siphoned off to the botmaster.
2Unfortunately, we did not have access to the Facebook topology or the upload patterns
of users.
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Figure 3: Average channel efficiency against ttl
(a) Normalized Bandwidth and Efficiency (b) Duplication
Figure 4: Communication channel bandwidth and efficiency
Channel Bandwidth and Efficiency: Figure 4 shows the bandwidth and
efficiency of the communication channel in the average case. Figure 4.a shows
the monthly average number of botcargo-fwd messages received by the botmaster
(normalized by the size of the botnet) for various amounts of botcargo-local mes-
sages collected per bot (constant across bots). Figure 4.a also shows the average
efficiency of the communication channel from a bot to the botmaster as the size
of the botcargo changes. The network seems to operate at an average efficiency
of 30% of collected botcargo reaching the botmaster when K = 2 (#botcargo
per bot per month). This decreases with increase in K although the absolute
number of messages delivered at the botmaster increases marginally from .75
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(a) Botcargo delivered (b) Cumulative botcargo delivered
Figure 5: Experimental results for the number of delivered batcargo
per bot for K = 2 to 2.5 per bot for K = 10. Further increases result in even
more marginal increases as the effects of congestion result in decreasing routing
efficiency. A positive effect of increasing per node botcargo collection sizes (K)
is the reduction in duplicate messages reaching the botmaster. This is shown in
figure 4.b, the proportion of duplicate messages rapidly decreases until K = 10
and further reduces to 40% at K = 20. We observe that the positive effects of
duplication reduction correspond with an increase in normalized bandwidth as
the number of botcargo-local messages collected per node increase.
The main result of our experiments is shown in figure 5. Figure 5.a shows
the average number of botcargo messages delivered to the botmaster. This
shows an increasing trend. This can be traced to the increasing number of
users and the number of average number of photo updates per user increase
over the months in our dataset. The sharp drops and increases are related to
routing performance under churn, when a few large uploaders suddenly stop
using uploading for certain periods of time, or dormant users being uploading in
larger numbers (say from one-two images to twelve-fifteen images per month).
Figure 5.b indicates the cumulative amount of traffic received by the botmaster
over the years and gives a sense of the total amount of sensitive material she
can steal and the long-term trends. Combining the total number of messages
reaching the botmaster (18000 botcargo-fwd) with the number of bits embedded
in each message, we obtain a monthly bandwidth of between 21.60MB/month
in the average case (q = 8) to 86.13MB (q = 2) for lower interference from the
image adaption process.
Overall, it is easy to see that even with a simple and naive routing algorithm
such as restrictive flooding, the botmaster is easily able to collect around 10%
of the total amount of stolen information. With a slightly more sophisticated
algorithm that exploits the presence of medium and high degree hub nodes
as super-peers, one could design a better routing algorithm. For instance, in
the current implementation all nodes behave the same way, hence hub nodes
also locally flood all the botcargo they receive. This is replayed back and forth
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between hubs and the rest of the network causing severe congestion. By ensuring
that super-peers carefully route incoming botcargo only to other super-peers,
we believe it should be possible to significantly improve network throughput.
5 Related work
Most current botnets use a peer-to-peer architecture [19, 20] which improves ro-
bustness and scalability. Botnet detection techniques exploit inter-bot interac-
tion patterns [16] or exploit the statistical characteristics of traffic flows [10, 28]
to localize bots. Both these approaches require access communication traffic
between the bots. By using (probabilistically) unobservable communication
channels, Stegobot evades all these detection approaches.
The work closest to ours is the work of Nappa et al. [17] who describe the
design of a resilient botnet using the Skype protocol for inter-bot communi-
cation. The use of Skype for VoIP communication is popular and is hence
difficult to block without annoying legitimate users. By hijacking active (logged
in) Skype sessions, the botnet is able to bypass firewalls that might otherwise
prevent bots from directly communicating with each other. Our design goes a
lot further due to the unobervability properties of our communication channel.
Unlike the design of Nappa et al., we do not add new connection end-points – no
communication between user-accounts (bots) that do not already communicate,
and no additional communication is introduced beyond what that users already
exchange, resulting in a stealthy design.
5.1 JPEG steganography
Practical steganography schemes are based either on heuristic methods or pro-
vide some provable security based on some specific model. One of the first prac-
tical steganography schemes for the JPEG images is the JSteg scheme [3, 21]. It
is based on using the Least Significant Bit (LSB) components of the quantized
DCT coefficients. More specifically, the message bits are simply replaced with
the LSBs of the DCT coefficients of an image, considering some exclusions for
preserving the image quality. The embedding path for the LSBs was originally
sequential while the use of pseudo-random path was suggested in later imple-
mentations. Even with pseudo-random path the LSB steganography techniques
are shown to be detectable through different kind of attacks [27, 29, 14, 13] that
exploit artifacts made in the first order statistics of the DCT coefficients.
These attacks led the next generation of the JPEG steganography schemes,
namely statistical restoration-based schemes, to consider preserving statistical
behavior of the cover images [24]. The main idea is to divide the cover image
into two disjoint parts, which one part is used to embed the message and the
other part is used to make corrections in order to preserve the selected statistical
behavior of the image. A related approach for preserving the statistical behavior
is used in the Model Based Steganography [22], where some specific model is
preserved for the DCT coefficients.
As an example of the heuristic steganography schemes we can mention the
F5 scheme [26], which was developed to address the detectability of the LSB-
based embedding schemes. By decreasing the absolute value of the coefficients
by 1 and using some other tricks the F5 scheme avoids the obvious artifacts on
12
different features of the image. To increase the embedding efficiency F5 uses a
coding scheme, namely Matrix Embedding.
Another approach for steganography, recently attracting more attention, is
the minimal distortion embedding [7, 12]. These schemes focus on increasing
the embedding efficiency by decreasing the embedding distortion. Newman
et al. in [18] propose JPEG-compatibility-steganalysis resistant method, which
embeds the message into the spatial domain of the image before performing the
JPEG compression. YASS [23] is a more recent scheme based on the approach
of minimal distortion embedding.
6 Conclusions
The essence of communication security lies not merely in protecting content
but also unobservability. In this paper, we have presented and analyzed the
design of a covert botnet using unobservable communication channels that aims
to steal sensitive information. The proposed botnet deploys innovative social
malware infection strategies to create an overlay network over the social com-
munication network of victims. A critical aspect of our design is the use of
image based steganographic techniques to hide bot communication and make it
indistinguishable from image noise. While techniques for image steganography
are well known, we go one step further to show that it is possible to design an
effective covert network by exploiting the social network connecting users and
the social habits of individual users.
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